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Policy Markets
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The Reg-Markets Center's "Policy Markets" web site provides resources for those interested in information markets. These markets--also known as event, prediction or decision markets--allow buyers and sellers to buy and sell contracts based on their expectations regarding the outcome of an uncertain future event. Examples of such events include the outcome of a presidential election, the price of an initial public offering, and the expected sales revenues from a product. Information markets have proved more prescient than experts' estimates in a variety of circumstances.
Because information markets have the potential to anticipate the consequences of choices, they could revolutionize the way the government, the non-profit world, and the private sector make decisions. They could also promote greater transparency and accountability in decision making.
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Policy Markets Features
Tetlock and Hahn Analyze Optimal Liquidity for Decision Makers
AEI-Brookings Joint Center Book Examines the Potential of Information Markets
Policy Markets Gets a Nod in Chris Masse's Annual Prediction Markets Awards
Time Magazine Features Joint Center Work on Information Markets
Hahn and Tetlock Explain How Information Markets Can Improve Policy
Tim Harford Discusses Hahn and Tetlock's Info Market Approach to Development
Tradesports Traders Predict Which Party Will Control Congress After the Midterms
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Decision Markets for Policy Advice, Robin Hanson. 2006. In Alan S. Gerber and Eric M. Patashnik, eds., Promoting the General Welfare: New Perspectives on Government Performance, 151-173, Brookings Institution Press. November(forthcoming). |
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Historical Presidential Betting Markets.
Paul W. Rhode and Koleman S. Strumpf. 2004. Journal of Economic Perspectives 18, 2: 127-142. |
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Prediction Markets. Justin Wolfers, Eric Zitzewitz. 2004. Journal of Economic Perspectives 18, 2: 107-126. |
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Markets as Information Gathering Tools.
C. R. Plott. 2000. Southern Economic Journal 67, 1: 2-15. |
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Wishes, Expectations and Actions: A Survey on Price Formation in Election Stock Markets.
R. Forsythe, T.A. Rietz, & T. W. Ross. 1999. The Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 39, 1: 83-110. |
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Decision Markets.
R. Hanson. 1999. IEEE Intelligent Systems 14, 3: 16-19. |
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Information Aggregation in Experimental Asset Markets: Traps and Misalligned Beliefs.
M. Noeth, C. F. Camerer, C. R. Plott, & M. Webber. 1999. Tech. rep. 1060, California Institute of Technology. |
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Prediction markets and information aggregation mechanism: Experiments and application.
K.-Y. Chen & C.R. Plott. 1998. Tech. rep., California Institute of Technology. |
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Comparing Peer Review to Information Prizes - A Possible Economics Experiment.
R. Hanson. 1995a. Social Epistemology 9, 1: 49-55. |
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Could Gambling Save Science? Encouraging an Honest Consensus.
R. Hanson. 1995b. Social Epistemology 9, 1: 3-33. |
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Anatomy of an Experimental Political Stock Market. R. Forsythe, F. Nelson, G.R. Neumann. 1992. American Economic Review 82, 5: 1142-1161 |
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Information Aggregation in an Experimental Market.
R. Forsythe & R. Lundholm. 1990. Econometrica 58 , 2: 309-347. |
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Futures Markets: Their Purpose, Their History, Their Growth, Their Successes and Failures.
D. W. Carlton. 1984. The Journal of Futures Markets 4, 3: 237-271. |
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Subjective Information and Market Efficiency in a Betting Market.
S. Figlewski. 1979. Journal of Political Economy 87, 1: 75-88.
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